The purpose of this article is to consider the basic premise of the Ash Council Report -that the structure of a regulatory agency has a profound effect on regulatory performance. This premise underlies three general proposals for reform which the report advances for broad application in these agencies:
1. The substitution of a single adminsitrator for the multi-headed board or commission.
2. Dramatic changes in the agencies' internal decisional process.
3. Judicial review by a new, nonconstitutional, specialized court, rather than the regular courts of appeal, or, in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission, a special three-judge district court. Each of these proposals will be briefly examined.
Regulatory Structure: The Single Administrator
The Ash Council recommends that the independent regulatory commissions in the transportation, power, securities, and consumer protection fields bte transformed into executive agencies headed by single administrators responsible to the President. The substitution of a single administrator for the multi-headed collegial body is the kingpin in the Ash Council's whole approach; it is presented almost as a universal panacea for the solution of the problems of the independent regulatory agencies.
The report recounts the advantages of a single administrator at great length. These advantages are framed in terms of relatively abstract concepts such as "accountability," "responsiveness," "efficiency," "good management," "expedition," and the like. We are told that these virtues, and other good things such as improved personnel, will flow from the substitution of a single administrator for the multi-headed collegial body. All of this is somewhat reminiscent of Lewis Carroll's remark that "It must be so because you have repeated it three times!"
In the view of the Ash Council, the single administrator is godlike, and the multi-headed collegial body suffers from a multitude of sins. The proposition is not supported by empirical evidence, but is asserted as a self-evident, universally applicable truth. I am skeptical of an assertion that seems over broad and that must be taken on faith.
The case that is made for the single administrator has a certain surface plausibility. There are areas, such as the current development of environmental standards by the Environmental Protection Agency, in which a single administrator reporting directly to the President seems likely to do a more effective job than a multi-headed board. Criteria for evaluating regulatory performance, it is evident, are needed in order to assess proposed changes in regulation. Until the goals against which regulation is to be measured are determined, it is impossible to determine whether or not those goals will be achieved by a structural change from a multi-headed body to a single administrator.2
The historical contest between Congress and the President for control or isolation of some of these regulatory functions needs also to be mentioned at this point. Two other plausible explanations of why regulation has defects must be explored before structure can be given the decisive role assigned to it by the Ash Council. One alternative theory is that many of the problems of regulation are inherent in the regulatory task itself, and especially when the regulatory task is one of giving out benefits to an industry which has constant contact with the dispensing agency. If a small group of regulated firms have great interest in regulatory activities, while the general public is only peripherally or marginally affected, it is inevitable that the information, concern, and political clout of the regulated firms will be effectively communicated to the agencies through our political process. Our regulatory agencies, regardless of organization, tend to be highly responsive to the political pressures that are brought to bear upon them. The general public, which brings its latent power to bear only in situations of failure or catastrophe that arouse general concern, has much less interest in influencing regulatory decisions. Regulators 
Agency Decisional Process
In addition to the substitution of single administrators for most of the present boards and commissions, the Ash Council Report proposes a dramatic short circuiting of the decisional stages now followed by most agencies. The initial decisions of hearing examiners in adjudicatory cases would become final agency decisions unless the single administrator, within a fixed period of 30 days, reversed or modified the initial decision because it was inconsistent with agency policy.
Only a limited opportunity for postponing a final decision by remanding a case for further hearing would be provided; and it would be subject to a further time limit of 30-45 days.
The While these objectives are laudable ones, it seems likely that the Ash Council proposal is more procrustean than workable. The choice between rule making and adjudication as a method of formulating policy is more complicated than the Ash Council indicated.0 And a number of agencies already have gone very far in delegating decisional authority in routine cases to hearing examiners or to employee boards. 1 Further steps along this line might achieve most of the objectives sought by this aspect of the Ash Council Report.
A major factor, not fully considered by the Ash Council, is the effect of its shortened decisional process on rights of party participation. The fixed period of review by the administrator -a review presumably limited to questions of general policy -would deprive the parties of any participation during the final decisional stage. Once the hearing examiner came down with his initial decision, there would be no exceptions, no briefs, no oral arguments. The administrator himself will have only 30 days to master -by some mysterious process, and without any further assistance from the parties -the complexities of the case and to reverse, modify, or affirm the decision.
The consequences of this procedure would be unfortunate. Briefs, exceptions, and oral arguments before an agency crystallize issues, illuminate the case, and help the agency reach a wiser and more informed decision. They also provide interested persons with an effective opportunity to educate the ultimate deciders.
Moreover, in many administrative cases, the issues develop and change as the case goes along. It is not unusual for the decision at the agency level to focus on matters that were not emphasized by the hearing examiner. In these situations, an opportunity to submit briefs and arguments when the case is before the agency for final decision may be an essential ingredient of fairness. Wholly apart from these workload considerations, the creation of specialized courts raises complicated problems concerning their role, personnel, and the like. The strongest argument for a specialized court can be made in areas like labor, tax, and trade -areas which cut across the whole economy rather than concentrate on a particular industry. Several years ago the American Bar Association proposed the creation of "administrative courts" to exercise final administrative authority in these areas.14 The Ash Council departs from these earlier proposals both as to subject matter (labor, tax, and trade are areas in which the Ash Report does not apply its "administrative court" proposal) and as to the nature of the court (appellate rather than trial court as in the earlier ABA proposals).
There "The status of the regulatory commissions raises complex issues of political theory and practice that cannot be evaluated solely in terms of managerial efficiency. Those issues may be grouped for convenience under the headings of independence and collegiality (or multimembership as distinct from a single chief officer). Independence -a matter of degree and in part a state of mind -has both positive and negative aspects. Detachment from external influences in making particularized decisions is generally considered to be desirable. Diffusion of responsibility that may produce hesitant or uncoordinated governmental policies is generally regarded as undesirable. Whether or not an agency is independent in these respects, however, is not exclusively determined by whether the agency is located within or outside the Executive Branch. Persuasive evidence has not yet been adduced to show that the independent commissions, to a significantly greater degree than executive agencies, have achieved the desired detachment or produced the weak or discordant policies. "While the Conference is not persuaded that the proposed form of agency organization -a single administrator responsible to the President -is generally superior to the collegial form, it may offer advantages in specific areas of regulation, particularly where vigorous departures from existing regulatory techniques are called for. Whether an existing regulatory framework should or should not be continued is largely dependent upon substantive rather than organizational considerations. If a decision were made, for example, to eliminate various restraints that now affect the various modes of transportation, the remaining regulatory controls might practicably be vested in a new agency structured differently from those now in existence. With respect to the other regulatory agencies, a major realignment of regulatory responsibilities is not proposed and a convincing case has not as yet been made for replacement of the collegial form with a single administrator. "
